We continue our series of tweaking Metasploit modules to bypass EMET, without changing Metasploit’s payloads. Last time, we talked about bypassing EMET’s EAF using SEH. Since this technique may not necessarily fit your exploit, we present a second technique that bypasses EMET’s EAF without using SEH or changing Metasploit’s payload.
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Microsoft’s Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) is designed to increase the protection of your system against exploitation. It can render current Metasploit modules useless, as they’re currently not designed to bypass it. We discuss ways to tweak Metasploit modules in as much a generic way as possible, so they can work against targets utilizing EMET.
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The official Poison Ivy Metasploit module has just been released. With the help of Juan Vazquez, the official module is a major upgrade to the original module I published. Here is some important information on how to use it.
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After providing a detailed exploit for Poison Ivy’s C&C server, the natural course of things was to incorporate it into the Metasploit framework. So here is a fully functional Metasploit module that exploits a remote Poison Ivy C&C server, bypassing DEP and ASLR, for all Windows versions.
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We are proud to present a new, growing collection from IBadishi Digital Art (the sharpest of you might note the family relationship 
). The collection features hack-me shirts (try to hack them!), ASCII art, geek chic, and simply cool gear. You can see some samples below. We would also love to hear what you think and what cool designs you would like to see, so feel free to leave your comments below.
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While working on Poison Ivy’s communication, one of my students approached me and asked me if the fact that an infected computer can connect to the C&C server means that the compromised host can break into the server. Well folks, it appears that it’s possible. We will now present a fully working exploit for all Windows platforms (i.e., bypassing DEP and ASLR), allowing a computer infected by Poison Ivy (or any other computer, for that matter) to assume control of PI’s C&C server.
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Lately, hackers are forced to be more and more creative as defense mechanisms are piling up, making exploitation more difficult. Most notably, data execution prevention (DEP) and address space layout randomization (ASLR), both present on Windows 7 and current browsers, make drive-by exploits a real pain. In this post we explain the concept of using the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler to bypass DEP and ASLR.
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Last time, we talked about MS12-024 (CVE-2012-0151), which states that a vulnerability in the way WinVerifyTrust operates could allow an attacker to modify a signed executable so that it runs arbitrary code, but the signature remains verifiable. We now give more details on the patch for Windows XP SP3.
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Every second Tuesday of the month, Microsoft releases a batch of security (and other) updates for its products. This is known as Patch Tuesday. Microsoft’s security updates for April 2012 contain several patches, one of them is described in security bulletin MS12-024. The bulletin talks about remote code execution through the use of specially-crafted, digitally-signed, portable executable (PE) files. The vulnerability is rated critical. To better understand what this is all about, we want to first see what a digitally-signed PE (using Windows Authenticode) looks like.
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After successfully decrypting Poison Ivy’s communication, we proceed to analyze the way the Poison Ivy (PI) server and client components interact. We prefer not to reverse engineer the components, but rather look at the data they send to each other and deduce what is going on. As you’ll soon see, we are way too optimistic.
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